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Abstract Urbanization in Kenya and perhaps in sub-
Saharan Africa can be described as prescriptive rather
than organic. We posit that this prescriptive urbaniza-
tion can be checked and balanced by employing the
governance model of devolution and rural capacity.
We first review competing views on urbanization in
Kenya during the colonial and postcolonial era and its
contribution to disenfranchising both urban and rural
inhabitants. We then examine devolution in Kenya
through the lens of Lefebvre’s theory of production of
space and the right to the city, enabling us to
contextualize and redefine ‘the right to the city’. In
the second part we analyze the potential of rural
capacity in Malaysia to absorb a large influx of return
immigrants and demonstrates how they have adapted
and benefited from the prosperity of land in the face of
diminishing energy resources and de-industrialization.
We conclude that coupling devolution with rural
capacity may hold the key to check rapid urbanization,
especially in Kenya.
Keywords Kenya  Malaysia  De-urbanization 
Devolution  Democracy and land capacity
Introduction
Urbanization in the developing world has often been
examined through the modernization theory (Morgan
1969); Harris 1990; (Njoh 2003; World Bank Report
2009) This view argues that rural immigrants are pulled
to urban areas by relatively high industrial wages
(Bradshaw 1988).However, this pull factor is due to the
‘perceived’ and not actual wage difference between
urban and rural areas (Todaro 1989).
Bradshaw (1988) points out that despite the problemof
urbanunemployment, economists generallyperceive rural
to urban migration as a positive feature because it
supposedly enhances total national output as citizens
move from areas of low marginal productivity and wages
(rural) to those with higher marginal productivity and
wages (urban). He goes further to quote (Kelley et al.
1984) who state ‘‘industrialization (and manufacturing
employment growth) has been the ‘engine of urbanization
growth’ in thepast andwill continue tobe so in the future’’.
This view is also supported by Polese (1997), Njoh
(2003), World Bank Report (2009). In its 2009 World
Developmental Report, the World Bank asserts that
Africa’s urbanization reflects industrialization. Citing
(Fay and Opal 2000), it states that urban population
growth and total GDP growth are correlated. The
A. Munya (&)  N. H. M. Hussain
School of Architecture and Planning, NICAI, The
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
e-mail: Andrew.Munya@auckland.ac.nz
N. H. M. Hussain
Faculty of Architecture, Planning and Surveying, UiTM
Perak, Seri Iskandar, Malaysia
M. B. Njuguna
Centre for Urban Studies, Jomo Kenyatta University of
Agriculture and Technology, Kiambu County, Kenya
123
GeoJournal (2015) 80:427–443
DOI 10.1007/s10708-014-9559-5
report further states that those countries with the
fastest growth in total GDP also witnessed the fastest
growth in urban population, a four fold increase, with
Benin and Zimbabwe as leading examples. The report
points out that the pace of urbanization was positively
correlated with growth in industries and services,
which are urban activities.
Using Iran as an example, it states that over time
and with the rural–urban development, the urban
disparities in welfare are narrow. The report also
suggests that population growth is linked to urbaniza-
tion and overall economic growth Fengler (2011a).
Writing on his blog Wolfgang Fengler, a Lead World
Bank economist for Kenya at the time, stated that;
No country has ever reached high income with
low urbanization. Kenya’s cities are already
powering the country’s economy. Nairobi and
Mombasa are home to 10 percent of the popu-
lation but represent 40 percent of the country’s
wage earnings. If cities thrive, the overall
economy will benefit. But cities will only
become true growth poles if Kenya continues
to upgrade infrastructure within and between
urban centers. (Fengler 2011b)
The disconnect here is that part of the report bases its
analysis on countries in North America, Western
Europe, Southeast Asia and Middle East whose model
of growth is entrenched in industrialisation. Urbani-
sation in some of these countries was mainly driven by
increased agricultural productivity and rapid industri-
alisation back of which was cheap fossil fuels (coal
and oil).
The report thus fails to point out this and other
complex processes and interdependencies between
city and country that result in the energy that sustain
urban industries and services as illustrated below.
Before industrialisation, plant growth represented a
larger percentage of the total energy available for
heating while human and animal muscle generated
mechanical energy (Wrigley 2010). Since all produc-
tive processes involved energy, the productivity of
land conditioned everything else due to the depen-
dence on plant photosynthesis, which only captured a
tiny fraction of energy from the sun. Any resultant
increase in populations in pre-industrial societies
meant that more and more land was required for
settlement while less and less was available for plant
cover that generated energy.
The discovery of fossil fuels provided a by-pass
which unlocked the energy constraint that had plagued
the pre-industrial society which had hitherto been
dependent on plant photosynthesis for its energy
requirements (Wrigley 2010). Thus coal and later oil
released the tension between how much land could be
settled and how much was left for the production of
energy through plant photosynthesis. Fossil energy
freed, more land for settlement and food production
from using minimal human and animal power. Conse-
quently the new sources of energy enabled opportuni-
ties for rapid growth and expansion in many sectors of
the economies resulting in industrialisation and subse-
quently urbanisation- the growth of modern day cities.
Fast forward to the twenty-first century and with
peaking fossil fuels, could the industrialised society be
heading toward the same energy constraints that pre-
industrialised economies struggled with? How prudent
and sustainable is the notion of developing nations
grounding their rapid urbanisation on the industrial
growth model? In their report, Our Common Interest,
Franks (2005), The Commission for Africa observed
that even though the future of the African continent is
closely linked to the development and management of
its cities, rapid urbanisation was not necessarily a
catalyst to its growth.
The report noted that whereas in the developed
world urbanization was linked to a rise in agricultural
productivity and industrialisation; the contrary is the
case in Africa. Rural–urban migration has been fuelled
by a failure of agricultural policies or regional conflict
and cities lack industries to provide jobs.
Further Okpala (1986) notes that much of the
concepts and theories applied in African urban studies
have been a wholesale importation of western urban
studies and their value systems without inclusion of
the corresponding African sociocultural and value
systems nor Africa’s point in the urban evolutionary
continuum. The result has been the systemic applica-
tion of prescriptive urban management policies and
programmes that have proved largely ineffective in the
application of limited resources thus exacerbating
already existing urban problems.
Other causes include historical factors such as
colonialism, labour migration perceived and not actual
income disparity between rural and urban regions,
commercial employment and urban reclassification.
The Commission further asserted that the urbani-
zation of poverty in Africa was becoming a major
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problem with about 72 % of the population in African
cities and towns living in slums. In Nairobi, it was
estimated that there are around 90 infant deaths per
1,000 compared to 76 in rural areas.
Consequently, this form of premature urbanisation
means that African cities and towns do not act as
engines of economic growth that can link to local and
international markets. Additionally, lack of trained
personnel and resources mean that African towns are
unable to be the centres of creativity and opportunity
(Franks 2005).
There has been little evidence to suggest that
conditions in urban areas in developing countries have
improved. Potts (1995) illustrates that increasing
economic decline in the 1980s in many African
countries and the impact of IMF’s structural adjust-
ment programmes combined to devastate the real
incomes of a large proportion of the urban population.
The result was a considerable narrowing gap between
real rural incomes and real urban incomes. Conse-
quently, the rate of urban growth slowed down
resulting in a new form of reversed migration from
urban to rural areas (Potts 1995).
Further systematic empirical research by Potts
(2005, 2006, 2009, 2012a, b, c) has continued to show
that the notion of rapid urbanisation in Africa no
longer holds true as presented by several reports
including the World Bank (2009) Developmental
Report. It is shown that there is much variation in
the urbanisation patterns of countries South of Sub
Saharan Africa. Her research further shows that levels
of urbanisation have been rising slowly, in some cases
remaining stagnant or declining all together in others.
Few African countries can lay claim to viable fossil
fuels that can be used to power and sustain rapid
urbanization. Those that have, for example Nigeria
and North African countries have been plagued by
internal conflicts. Although Kenya discovered oil
recently the oil is yet to be commercially exploited.
From the foregoing discussion, two schools of
thought emerge. The first led by the proponents of the
modernization theory (World Bank 2009) who per-
ceive rapid urbanization as the main ‘engine of
growth’ for developing countries. This view is
primarily based on growth models of industrialised
nations. It is a form of prescriptive urbanization for
developing countries since it negates the fundamental
factor behind sustainable urbanisation- nonrenewable
fossil fuel energy; of which developing countries have
less in abundance and which is peaking in developed
nations. It also negates Africa’s point in the urban
evolution continuum (Okpala 1986).
The second school of thought belongs to those who
do not perceive Africa’s growth through rapid urban-
ization and seek an alternative growth model suitable
for Africa’s unique set of circumstances. The Com-
mission of Africa Report seems to hold this view.
Whether that model will lead to urbanisation or not
remains to be seen.
However at the moment the question remains
whether rapid urbanisation is necessarily good for
developing countries and if not, what are some of the
measures to check and balance this urbanisation. This
paper examines Kenya and Malaysia, due to emerging
evidence of de-urbanisation that is occurring in both
countries.
In Kenya, Potts (1995, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2012a, b,
c) has shown evidence of declining rates of urbaniza-
tion in most of sub-Saharan Africa while in Malaysia
there is evidence of de-industrialization due to
depleting oil and gas resources. However while the
factors behind de-urbanisation in both countries are
different, there are lessons that Kenya can learn from
Malaysia’s industrialization, subsequent urbanization
and now de-industrialization process.
Thus the paper discusses the push and pull factors
that might be the case in both countries. In addition,
Kenya and Malaysia have a similar historical colonial
heritage linked to resource exploitation. They also
have comparable differences in ethnic and cultural
compositions as far as forms of governance are
concerned. Additionally there is are comparable
difference in the way the discovery of fossil fuels
has/will play in both Malaysia and Kenya’s urbaniza-
tion process respectively.
This paper examines two processes (devolution and
rural capacity) that might hold the key to check and
balance the processes of rapid urbanisation while
simultaneously ensuring equitable distribution of
resources between rural and city.
The production of space and right to the city
in urban Kenya
In the, ‘The Production of Space, Lefebvre and
Nicholson-Smith (1991) outlines urban space in three
dimensions i.e. perceived space, conceived space and
GeoJournal (2015) 80:427–443 429
123
lived space. Perceived space is that physical or
concrete representation of space people experience
each day. Conceived space refers to the mental
construction of that space, i.e. how people view it
and would wish it to be, or create it. Lived space
encompasses both conceived and perceived space i.e.
an individual’s everyday reality and experiences of,
and in space.
Lived space is space associated with images and
symbols. It is the dominated and hence passively
experienced space which the imaginations seek to
change and appropriate (Lefebvre and Nicholson-
Smith 1991). Subsequently this is the space with
certain exceptions that tends toward more or less
coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.
In reading Lefebvre, Purcell (2002) opines that,
lived space is not just a passive stage on which social
life unfolds, but an embodiment of social life itself in
which social relations and lived space are inseparable.
Purcell (2002) avers that according to Lefebvre,
producing urban space equates to producing and
reproducing all aspects of urban life (i.e. all the three
dimensions of space) and not just the concrete space of
the city. How then can this urban space be produced?
Lefebvre’s work on right to city offers one way in
which urban space maybe produced.
According to Lefebvre the ‘right to the city’ is
underpinned by two principles. It includes the princi-
ple of participation and appropriation for urban
inhabitants. Participation gives a central role to
citizens in all decisions leading to the production of
urban space. The principle of appropriation suggests
that citizens should be able to physically access,
occupy and use that urban space. Subsequently the
right to the city therefore while furthering the interests
of the urban inhabitants, it is supposed to benefit the
whole society (Lefebvre and Nicholson-Smith 1991).
Among the scholars who have examined Lefeb-
vre’s work on the right to the city, Purcells work
(Purcell 2002, 2006, 2013, 2014), gives a much more
broader and deeper analysis of what this concept really
means and its implications on urban governance.
Purcell’s interpretation of the right to the city
suggests that whereas conventional forms of enfran-
chisement empower national citizens, the right to the
city empowers only urban inhabitants. That unlike
conventional enfranchisement where membership to
the society could be as a result of different process
like, birth, nationality, ethnicity or naturalisation,
under the right to city, the same membership is
dependent upon the physical presence of the individ-
ual in the city and by living their daily routine within
the city.
However this critique like the World Bank Report
(2009) on urbanisation, takes a narrow view of the
inherent interdependencies and interactions between
city and rural which lead to the process of urbanisation.
It also assumes that the creation of cities through
urbanisation is a single event rather than a complex
process set in several stages involving competing and
complementing events and interests by different actors
in different spaces in time and space. Along this
process, there is enfranchisement and disenfranchise-
ment of both rural-and urban inhabitants.
Further, as illustrated earlier, at the back of the
urbanisation process, is energy, most of which is found
in the country. The mining and appropriation of this
energy resource is often always done at the expense of
the rural communities with little or no compensation.
Take for instance the discovery of oil in the rural
County of Turkana in North Eastern Kenya.
To extract this oil, the local community has to be
relocated to pave way for the construction of oil rigs
and other attendant services. The social and cultural
cost of relocation of these indigenous and pastoral
communities cannot be equivalent to the monetary
compensation. Neither is the ecological and environ-
mental risk associated with any oil spill if it was to
happen.
Nevertheless, the oil will be mined and the energy
thereof used to produce goods and services. Some of
these goods and services include the wireless network
infrastructure and the mobile phones that would ease
communication for an inhabitant in Turkana. At the
same time, an inhabitant in Nairobi will be benefiting
from the energy provided by this oil for example
reduced fuel prices and other urban services.
If we were to employ Purcell’s, (2002) argument
that the ‘right to the city’ is principally for urban
inhabitants, it will be incongruous then, in the above
case for the inhabitant in Nairobi to claim that he/she
has the most legitimate right to the city by virtue of his/
her birth/residence in the city. Or that he/she has claim
to the rural space because the mobile phone produced
in the city is helping the rural inhabitant.
Equally incongruous would be the claim by the
inhabitant in rural Turkana that he/she has the most
legitimate right to the urban and rural space because
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the oil whose energy powers the city is mined in his
county. Both inhabitants use goods and services that
are produced as a result of the complex interdepen-
dencies between city and country. Therefore both of
them have a legitimate claim to either space.
If this claim were to be weighted, then it should be
equivalent to the ratio of the energy that has gone into
the production of that good or service less the effort
put in producing the good or service. However if we
were to take out the energy in the equation, then
neither the city nor rural inhabitant would have a valid
claim to either space. This is because there would, no
longer be any good or service produced. The legiti-
mate claim to these energy lies with the one who
created it in the first place. And that is a natural process
over billions of years.
It follows then that if the process of urbanisation is a
direct consequence of complex rural-city interactions
in all forms, then no one group of inhabitants can lay
claim to the ‘right to the city’. Therefore, the right to
the city’ as suggested by Lefebvre is meant to benefit
all of society. The question of who benefits first or last
remains a matter of debate. Thus the right to city can
be redefined to mean the process of laying claim to the
shaping power of enfranchisement, whether in urban
or rural spaces, by all those contributing to the process
of urbanisation or de-urbanisation.
Redefining the ‘right to city’ this way, enables this
paper to situate and discuss the process of devolution
in Kenya, as one of the tools for enfranchising both
urban and rural inhabitants, and subsequently as a
check and balance mechanism for rapid urbanisation
in Kenya. Consequently, it matters not who should lay
claim to the right to the city or who should benefit first
or last.
Colonialism, urban disenfranchisement and right
to the city in Kenya
Early Pre and Post-colonial urbanisation in Kenya
acted to disenfranchise urban citizens and conse-
quently denied them the right to the city (Otiso and
Owusu 2008). Colonialism in Kenya was one of the
key precipitous of urbanisation.
Colonialists for instance crafted policies that pre-
vented Africans from accessing the cities under the
guise of controlling crime and promoting balanced
development between rural and urban whose real
intention however was segregation in the form of
preserving the ‘white’ character of the city (Njoh
2003). The few Africans who were allowed in the city
served as labourers in construction of the railway,
roads, home guards, cooks, maids and other unskilled
jobs for white settlers. As opposed to their white
counterparts, they were housed in segregated camps
and urban reserves (Otiso and Owusu 2008).
(Morgan 1969) notes, ‘‘Migration into towns is
subject to both a ‘pull’ and a‘push’. The push is the
lack of opportunity in the countryside. In economic
terms, this is the problem of rural unemployment or
under-employment. The result of this segregation was
that few Kenyans, ever perceived the city as a
permanent home. To most of them the city was the
‘work place’, while the rural area, was the ‘home’
where they owned a piece of land that they hoped to
develop and retire to sometime.
Post-colonial urbanisation did little to correct these
regional disparities. Kenya’s economic path after colo-
nialism was a laissez-faire approach with emphasis on
African capitalism and socialism focussing on economic
growth rather than equity (Nugent 2004). In his book
Devil on the Cross (wa Thiong’o 1987) dramatically
captures the moment thus as illustrated by Njoh (2003);
I thought I should go to the capital of Kenya to
look for work. Why? Because when money is
borrowed from foreign lands, it goes to build
Nairobi and the other big towns. As far as we
peasants are concerned, all our labor goes to
fatten Nairobi and the big towns (wa Thiong’o
1987).
(wa Thiong’o 1987) captures a much deeper meaning in
what amounts to a ‘parasitic’ relationship between city
and country, with the former as the parasite. He decries
the negative impact urbanizationwas having on the rural
areas, sapping all its [rural] energy without reciprocat-
ing. This is also captured by Odhiambo and Manda
(2003) in their study that found a positive correlation
between urban poverty and labor force participation.
They point out that even though labor earning is themain
source of income for urban poor, participation in the
labor market does not necessarily lift households out of
poverty. They further add that, the working urban poor
accounted for over half of the urban poor.
This conclusion contradicts earlier findings by
(Njoh 2003) which stated that urbanisation and
development in sub Saharan regions are positively
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linked as measured in terms of Human Development
Index (HDI). While Njoh (2003) used health, knowl-
edge and living standards to illustrate his point,
Odhiambo andManda (2003) showed that being urban
poor does not guarantee access to these services. Both
(wa Thiong’o 1987) wish to emigrate to the city and
(Odhiambo and Manda 2003) study clearly captures
the continued disenfranchisement of both rural and
urban folk since the colonial times, echoing how both
sets of inhabitants had been denied the right to the city.
Devolution and the right to the city in Kenya
In 2010, Kenya passed a new constitution. One of the
key chapters in the constitution is devolution. The
push for devolution came on the back of consistent
failures in governance by the central state in terms of
inclusion, equity participation and appropriation of
resources and services in national building. By
definition devolution is the process of the transfer of
political, administrative and fiscal management pow-
ers between central government and lower level of
government, primarily operating at city and regional
levels (Mwenda 2010).
Muia (2008) states that during the constitutional
review process in Kenya, the people in their submission
to the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
(CKRC) agitated for devolution of power to either
districts or provinces out of widespread feeling that too
muchpowerwas concentrated at the centre both spatially
and constitutionally. Spatially, the seat of power was the
capital Nairobi. That the people felt alienated and
excluded in the decision making process that led to
national building whether in urban or rural areas.
Devolution, it is argued enhances democracy by
bringing government closer to the people. Second it
protects democracy through different tiers of government
via vertical checks and balances and third, that by
distributing authority and responsibility for fiscal man-
agement and public service delivery,minorities are given
a stake in the systemwhich helps in conflictmanagement
(Mwenda 2010). Devolution in Kenya was crafted to
address ethnic, marginalization, inequality and historical
injustices that had brought about under development and
regional disparities.With devolution, local, communities
will have the right to set their agenda for the development
and management of resources at county level.
Furthermore, devolution in Kenya is predicated on
three fundamental principles; first, the creation of a
county government based on democratic principles
and the separation of powers. Second, County gov-
ernments are allocated reliable sources of revenue
from the central government and source for other
revenue to govern and deliver these services effec-
tively (The Constitution of Kenya 2010). This revenue
is set to 15 % of the total national revenue even though
the current government allocated 30 %, twice the
amount as set in the constitution to all the 47 counties.
Third, gender equality has been considered where no
more than two thirds of the members of the represen-
tative bodies in each county government shall be of the
same gender.
The objectives and objects and principles of a
devolved government are listed as follows in Chap-
ter 11, Section 174 of the constitution of Kenya.
(a) To promote democratic and accountable exercise
of power
(b) To foster national unity by recognizing diversity
(c) To give powers of self-governance to the people
and enhance the participation of the people in the
exercise of the powers of the state and in making
decisions affecting them
(d) To recognize the right of communities to manage
their own affairs and to further their development
(e) To protect and promote the interests and rights of
minorities and marginalized communities
(f) To promote social and economic development
and the provision of proximate, easily accessible
services throughout Kenya
(g) To ensure equitable sharing of national and local
resources throughout Kenya
(h) To facilitate the decentralization of state organs,
their functions and services from the capital of
Kenya and to enhance checks and balance and
the separation of powersvies and principles of
devolved government.
Taken together, theoretically these principles
directly give the citizens a voice and a seat in the
decision-making processes at local level that may lead
to any production of space whether urban or rural.
Consequently, in devolution citizens have a right to
the city, even though this right is through institution-
alized filters like the county assembly. This is because
Kenya, constitutionally still remains, a unitary State.
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The power structure in county government
Political decentralization
An elected governor heads each county government,
which consist of an elected county assembly and a
county executive. The assembly consists of elected
members representing each ward in the county who
are elected for a period of five terms. In its compo-
sition there are provisions for special and marginalized
groups-youths, women and the disabled.
Administrative decentralization
The executive authority of the county is vested in a
county executive committee that consists of an elected
county governor and the county executive committee.
The county executive committee consists of the
governor and deputy governor and membership of
persons who are not members of the assembly,
appointed by the governor with the approval of the
assembly. Themembership cannot exceed one-third of
the county assembly members if the assembly has less
than thirty or ten if the assembly has thirty or more.
Members of a county executive committee are
accountable to the county governor in exercising their
duties and powers. The county executive is tasked with
implementing county legislation and national legisla-
tion within the county. It also manages and coordi-
nates the functions of the county administration and its
departments and any other functions conferred to it by
the constitution or national legislation. Additionally it
may prepare proposed legislation for consideration for
by the county assembly.
At national level, a Senator in the Senate represents
each county. The senate is constitutionally mandated
to make decisions about revenue allocations to the
counties (Fig. 1) .
Fig. 1 Structure of County
governments Source
Commission for Revenue
Allocation-Kenya, 2014
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Fiscal decentralization-revenue allocation
The Commission for Revenue Allocation (CRA) has
come up with a formula for allocating the 15 % county
revenue share, among the 47 counties. 84.5 % goes to
the national government while the remaining 0.5 % is
earmarked as an equalization fund. This formula
allocates revenue based on the weight of the following
parameters: 1-Population-45 %, 2-Poverty Index-
20 %, 3-Land Area-8 %, 4-Basic Equal Share-25 %,
5-Fiscal Responsibility-2 % (CRA 2014) (Fig. 2).
Of note is that the revenue allocation is aimed to
ensure equitable distribution of resources in all the 47
counties in Kenya. It implies that counties with higher
population, poverty index and a large land mass will
receive more revenue. Given the historical develop-
ment disparities among counties in Kenya, this
formula is transparent and a good start. The formula
also takes into account the fixed costs of operating
county governments and allocates an equal share for
this purpose (Kimenyi 2013) with a 2 % incentive for
fiscal responsibility.
Functions of county governments
Detailed functions of county governments are found in
Schedule Four of the Kenya Constitution 2010. In
summary, county governments are tasked with the
provision of the following services at county level
including; health care, agriculture, pre-primary educa-
tion, trade development,maintenance of local roads and
county planning. Counties are supposed to use their
allocated share of revenue to provide these services. In
turn, these county governments will receive a share of
national revenues. The county governmentswill also be
expected tomobilize revenue fromother sources within
their counties, such as taxes on property and entertain-
ment. The national government is responsible for
overall policy formulation in all areas including public
investment. Basically county governments are required
to work within the framework of, and implement the
policy formulated by national government.
The Constitution also makes it clear that national
legislation shall provide for the governance and
management of urban areas and cities and specifically
establish criteria for classifying urban areas and cities
as laid out by the Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011.
The principles of governance and management of
urban areas are also vested in the national legislation
as well as the provision of participation by residents in
the governance of urban areas and cities.
Can devolution promote the right to the city
for both rural and urban inhabitants?
Since this paper established that energy and its
appropriation is the power behind urbanisation and
since most of it is found in rural areas, not one group of
inhabitants can lay claim to the right to the city. Both
city and rural inhabitants have a legitimate claim to
either space due to the inherent interdependencies of
both city and country. As such the right to the city was
redefined as the process of laying claim to the shaping
power of enfranchisement, whether in urban or rural
spaces, by all those contributing to the process of
urbanisation and subsequently, de-urbanisation.
Within this context, it can be argued that devolution
in Kenya has been structured to some extent, to
promote both participation and appropriation by both
rural and urban inhabitants towards rural and urban
enfranchisement, even though this participation has
been institutionalized.
Fig. 2 Formula for revenue allocation-Source: Commission for
Revenue Allocation. Cai = Pi ? PVi ? Ai ? BSi ? FRi,
where: Ca = Revenue allocated to county i = 1, 2…47.
Pi = Revenue allocated to a county on the basis of population
parameter. PVi = Revenue allocated to a county on the basis of
poverty gap parameter. Ai = Revenue allocated to a county on
the basis of land area. BSi = Revenue allocated to a county on
the basis of basic equal share parameter. This is share equally
among the 47 counties. FRi = Revenue allocated to a given
county on the basis of fiscal responsibility. This is shared equally
among the 47 counties. (Commission on Revenue Allocation
2014)
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This structure can be seen in three ways: firstly
political decentralization where, county citizens elect
their own county government in a democratically
recognized process, secondly administrative decen-
tralization where each county appoints an executive
committee that manages county affairs and delivers on
county services, thirdly, fiscal decentralization where
each county draws up its own budget based on revenue
allocated and tax collected as mandated by the
constitution.
In the devolution structure of Kenya, the right of
citizens to participate in the production of space at
county level is filtered through local institutions and
direct participation in such decisions like election of
the county assembly members and the governor.
Through the county assembly, citizens participate in
vetting the county executives who will be tasked with
actualizing the counties agenda.
Nine months into the implementation of devolution
structure, governors’ across the country met to assess
the progress and challenges encountered so far. During
the Summit on Leadership and Governance (Nation
Media Group 2014), Attorney General of Kenya (AG),
Professor Githui Mugnai pointed out that in a bid to
strengthen local participation in appropriating county
resources like mining minerals, his office was working
with local communities to have a legal right in law to
any appropriation of such minerals.
This move is reflective of Lefebvre’s ideas of right
to the city as benefiting both rural and urban inhab-
itants. It echoes direct participation and a seat at the
negotiating table for local citizens in the decision
making process, that leads to the production of space.
In dispersing political and economic power to coun-
ties, each community then becomes a ‘master of its
destiny’ eliminating the need for perceived isolation
while still maintaining Kenya as a unitary state.
However while the AG assured Governors that
devolution was legally entrenched in the constitution,
the governors pointed out several challenges at county
level. Some of these included; weak institutional
capacity which made counties vulnerable to corrup-
tion. Another challenge was political power play
between the Governors, National Assembly and the
Senate. The AG attributed this to the effects of re-
alignment of the various political houses in the face of
a new constitutional dispensation. Also noted was the
effectiveness of the transitional institutions that are
overseeing the devolution process. The general feeling
was that these institutions were not being as effective
as required.
Constitutional constraints on devolution was also a
major issue that counties were grappling with espe-
cially in regard to provision of services like security,
education, health, agriculture, roads and transport.
This is because while the overall mandate in policy
formulation for these services lay with the national
government, the extent of its implementation at county
level was still a ‘grey’ area open to interpretation by
either party (County or National government). Con-
sequently Governor’s were bearing the brunt from
citizens at county level where the quality of service
delivery was wanting.
Nevertheless, feedback from individual governors
indicated that overall, people feel more included and
participated in county affairs since the advent of
devolution. Keynote Speaker, Hon. Geneva Fourier—
The Permanent Executive Secretary at The All Africa
Ministerial Conference on Decentralization and Local
Government (AMCOD) concluded that; ‘Decentral-
ization is the only way to address people’s needs by
taking services closer to them’. She added that
decentralization is the key to Africa’s challenges
(Nation Media Group 2014) She pointed out that there
is need to seek a form of decentralization that appeals
to the African situation and singled out Kenya as
having the chance to set that example.
Can devolution check and balance rural–urban
migration in Kenya?
In the previous analysis, the causes of Internal
urbanization in Kenya were pointed out as colonial-
ism, rural–urban inequalities, under employment and
unemployment in rural areas, perceived income dis-
parities between rural and urban areas among others.
This was unlike in the developed countries where
urbanisation was underpinned by the discovery of
fossil fuel energy and increased agricultural produc-
tivity creating the need for trade, military and defence
among other issues. It was also established that even in
urban areas the promised dream of enfranchisement
was more of a mirage than a reality, with chronic
unemployment, congestion, increasing urban poverty
and crime among others (wa Thiong’o 1987, Od-
hiambo and Manda 2003)
The structure of devolution is addressing the very
same push factors that were responsible for rural–
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urban immigration in the first place. This is because
89 % (42 out of 47) of all the counties in Kenya are
rural under the new Urban Areas and Cities Act, 2011.
Under fiscal decentralisation, the formula for revenue
allocation favours counties with a high population,
high poverty index and large landmass
Most of the 42 rural counties meet these criteria,
Like Turkana, North Eastern, Tana River, Wajir and
others. These counties like Turkana have recently
discovered oil and other natural resources. Conse-
quently as devolution starts to take root, and rural
counties start to develop capacity and offer hope, it is
expected that most urban residents may react to the
push factors in urban areas and the pull factors in rural
counties thus precipitating urban–rural migration.
Even though rapidly urbanizing counties like
Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and Thika have a high
population and will enjoy higher revenue allocation,
push factors like declining urban economies, increas-
ing urban poverty, crime, congestion, unreliable
transport, chronic unemployment with low wages
and high costs of living may eventually push some
residents to find opportunities in developing rural
counties.
Further most of Kenya’s energy and other natural
resources are largely found in the rural counties. For
instance, the discovery of oil in rural Turkana in North
Western Kenya, hydropower dams and geothermal
springs in rift valley, rare minerals in Mombasa the
coastal county and wildlife in Narok.
Devolution has politically empowered counties and
subsequently the local citizens. Counties with these
significant deposits of energy resources and other
minerals are demanding not only a significant share of
any wealth accrued from exploiting these minerals but
also direct participation in the exploitation of the
resources.
For instance, the recent standoff between Tullow
oil (a British oil exploration company) and Turkana
residents that led to a 2 week closure of the company’s
operations, was mainly due to the perception by the
residents that the company was not offering enough
and significant jobs to the local residents. Further the
discovery of hydrocarbons in the County and offshore
gas deposits, has led to local communities demanding
for 25 % of the revenue when commercial production
starts (The EastAfrican 02/02/2013)
It is arguable that this new found agitation for
grassroots participation in the appropriation of local
natural resources in East Africa can be directly linked
to devolution and the new found democratic space at
the grassroots level. Unlike in the past where such
protest would have been silenced by deployment of
security forces, in the new dispensation, most analysts
are calling for clear rules of engagement between
investors and hosts. The mining of rare earth minerals
in Kwale county has also faced criticism and agitation
from the local county government with the residents
demanding greater representation in the decision
making process of how the wealth should be appro-
priated. As a result, the AG’s office is working with
local communities at county level to have a legal right
in law towards appropriation of these minerals
This all goes to show that unlike in the past where
all the wealth and labour generated in the rural areas,
went to ‘fatten up’ the city, (wa Thiong’o 1987), with
devolution, this is all set to change. Rural counties are
agitating for retention of a significant share of the
wealth within their boundaries.
Subsequently rapidly urbanizing counties like Nai-
robi, and others who have little or no energy resources
of their own to sustain urbanization will have to either
find alternative means of supporting the urbanization
process or enter into negotiated agreement with rural
counties on how to share these resources. One way for
rapidly urbanizing counties like Nairobi, Nakuru and
others to manage with limited energy resources will be
to de-urbanize.
Ancestral land as a pull factor
Because earlier colonial policies disenfranchised
Kenyans in urban areas, and set the stage for
subsequent governments to do so, most urban inhab-
itants never considered the city as a permanent home.
To them the city was a temporary place-more like a
‘place of work’, while rural areas were considered the
real and permanent home (Otiso and Owusu 2008) The
definition of home in traditional Kenya was a place
where one grew up and owned land, either through
inheritance or purchase and constructed a house
whether permanent or temporary. This place is almost
always in the country.
This perception has prevailed to this day, as
evidenced by the large number of travellers heading
upcountry during Easter or Christmas holidays. Asked
where they are travelling to, the answer is always
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‘home’. Most of these travellers retreat back to their
rural homes where they have bought or inherited land
from their families but do not have the time nor funds
to develop it since they all work in the city.
Such a piece of land in the rural areas is maintained
as a safety net should things not work out in the city
and also for retirement and eventually as a burial
place. Therefore, most urban residents work to remit
money back to the rural areas to develop these pieces
of property. In this way, most urban inhabitants while
still preferring to live in the city, have one ‘foot’ in the
country. Consequently they have essentially left the
door open for return to the country should things
improve in the rural or go wrong in the city.
Sceptics who perceive urban areas, as the only
centres of growth tend to see this investment in rural
land and property as ‘dead capital’ and as ‘contradic-
tions in African poverty’ fuelled by societal culture
(Fengler 2011a; Ndemo 2014;Warah 2010). They tend
to be cynical about the value of culture to economic
growth and the impact of devolution on urbanization.
However, peaking non-renewable energy resources
will eventually lead to declining urban economies. The
‘dead capital’ could then be ‘resurrected’ through pull
factors like the development of rural capacity.
The discovery and appropriation of natural
resources in the rural areas towards rural capacity
development, may in future act as a pull factor for
these urban migrants who still have an ancestral
attachment to the land and their clan. These ancestral
connections to rural land in Kenya, resonates with the
Malaysian experience where fertile unattended
reserve land in rural Malay is protected by legislation,
which has inherently left the door open for the returned
migrants. Further contextual similarities between
Kenya and Malaysia include;
Shared colonial history- both countries were col-
onised by the British for approximately the same
period and exploited for ‘photosynthetically’ produced
energy: tea and coffee in Kenya, rubber in Malaysia
(Henry 1983). Colonialism created international
involvement such as in the economic, administration
and resources exchange, which allowed industrialisa-
tion and subsequently urbanization.
There is a comparable difference in the industrial-
ization process of the two countries linked to the
discovery of natural resources. While Malaysia’s is
witnessing signs of de-industrialization due to deplet-
ing oil and gas, Kenya has just discovered oil and gas
and is at risk of following the industrial growth model
of Malaysia and other developed countries due to
prescriptive urbanization policies. What can Kenya
learn from the Malaysian experience of industrializa-
tion, urbanization and now de-industrialization?
Another comparable difference is in the ethnic and
tribal dimension in the governance structures and land
law administration. In Kenya geographical location
and ethnicity are almost synonymous, a legacy of
colonialism. There are 42 tribes in Kenya with
numerous ethnicities. The result has been that
devolved units by default reflect tribal homogeneity
with counties that host major cities like Nairobi and
Mombasa being the exception rather than the norm
(Adam et al. 1992). The 2007/08 post election
violence in Kenya orchestrated massive internal
migration of people of the same ethnic persuasion to
return to their ancestral homes further blurring the line
between geography and ethnicity.
On the other hand Malaysia does not have tribal
issues but does have ethnic issues. Experience in the
racial riots in 1969 has created attention and awareness
on the ethnic issues, which could possibly lead to an
imbalance in ethnic distribution between the urban and
rural. As the protected land only covers the aboriginal
and the Malays, therefore, the potential of reverse
migrationwillmostly affect theMalays to return to land
in the rural compared with other ethnicity in Malaysia.
Similarly in Kenya, even though same tribes are
heavily concentrated in their specific counties, the
formula for revenue allocation ensures equitable dis-
tribution of revenue across board,with preference given
to themost poor counties, with large landmass and high
population. Each county essentially has to determine its
destiny. In Kenya therefore reverse migration is
expected to affect all communities across board.
These similarities and differences between Kenya
and Malaysia set the stage to discuss rural capacity in
Malaysia as a pull factor in triggering de-urbanization.
We examine the potential rural capacity in Kampong
Gunong Pasir, Negeri Sembilan region in Malaysia to
absorb the urban returnees from city to rural if de-
urbanisation occurs.
De-urbanisation and the case of Malaysia
In line with previous discussions, this section explores
how reverse migration and utilizing the prosperity
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from rural reserve land would be an alternative to
overcome de-urbanisation. Its focus is on Malaysia,
which is facing trends of de-industrialization as a
result of peaking fossil fuels. The intention is to
investigate the capacity of rural areas to absorb the
return migrants from cities.
After Independence in 1957, the opportunities
offered by urban areas resulted in massive rural to
urban migration. The emerging industrialization
(electronic industries) was the main pull factor that
attracted many obedient and diligent young-unmarried
women (Ariffin1994; Byrd 2012) to move into cities.
This massive rural to urban migration shifted 70 % of
the rural society to 70 % urban in less than two
decades and created a new urban society. While the
population growth in cities increased, the land in the
rural areas was left unattended.
Malaysia is fortunate to have significant areas of
fertile reserve land that is covered by unique legisla-
tion. The legislation states that Malay reserve land can
only be owned and held by the Malays and cannot be
sold (Leete 2007; Zaki et al. 2010). This legislation has
been discussed by, among others, Zaki et al. (2010)
who found that although the land tenure system in
Peninsular Malaysia has undergone several changes
since 1957, the Malay reserve land and the customary
land tenure system is still implemented especially
among the rural Malay society. This has left the door
open for the urban migrant to return to the land.
Against this backdrop is the dwindling supply of
gas and oil in Malaysia and increasing Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) competition from neighbouring
countries that is threatening Malaysia’s economic
growth. These issues have provoked debates about the
sustainable future of industrialisation (Whittaker et al.
2010). With scarce resources; cities stand to lose the
vital components of economic growth which will
affect social structure and livelihoods.
The rural capacity: case study in Kampog Gunong
Pasir, Negeri Sembilan
Prior to industrialization in the 1970s, there had been a
decline in agricultural development in Malaysia
(Drabble 1993). Over 800,000 hectares of agricultural
land was abandoned or underutilised, and Negeri
Sembilan was reported to be the state that faced the
highest levels of decline. Kassim (1989) stated that
53.8 % of agricultural land in Negeri Sembilan was
underutilised in 1981.
She added that these abandoned agricultural lands
remained subject to ‘Tanah Adat’, or customary land
use, meaning that they are protected by laws and
cannot be sold. For these reasons, Negeri Sembilan has
been purposely chosen for this study, not only because
of its abandoned land, but also for the unique history
and laws surrounding the customary title.
Kampong Gunong Pasir in Seri Menanti, Negeri
Sembilan was chosen as the sample area based on
criteria such as its location in the foothills of the
North–South range which cross Peninsular Malaysia,
enabling the land to be fertile but not exposed to
excessive development. Kampong Gunong Pasir cov-
ers approximately 127.48 hectares and consists of 122
houses, only 61 of which are still occupied by the 208
residents. This paper has deliberately selected a
sample of 30 respondents to follow in regards to
house and compound activities which are based on the
available green area. The intention is to investigate the
land capacity of inhabitants within the sample area.
Analyses of land use change were performed on a
grid basis, with reference to the secondary data and
observations. This approach is one of the common
methods used for spatial analysis and has been applied
to analysing land use patterns by Abdullah and
Nakagoshi (2006); Haines-Young (1992). Grids of
1 kmx1km were developed using the GIS application
of ArcView 3.2, which is suited to covering the whole
study area (macro scale). For the grids at the border of
the areas that were covered, less than 10 % of the total
land area was omitted to avoid inaccuracy.
Figure 3a shows the changing patterns of land use
activities between three temporal years. Clearly, there
was a significant decrease in settlement areas from the
1950s to the 1970s and up to 2011 (Fig. 3b these
changes occurred during the rural to urban migration
period, when most of the houses (settlements) were
left unattended and abandoned.
This unattended land is protected under the Malay
Reserves Land and Customary Land Act, meaning it
has legal protection and cannot be worked or sold.
This situation has led to the agricultural decline in
Negeri Sembilan in early 1980s (Kassim (1988, 1989).
Kassim (1989) also highlights that this land use
changes situation has shrunk the agricultural mass
production into domestic use due to the loss in local
demand.
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However, beginning in the early twentieth century,
the 9th Malaysia Plan was revised which the attention
needed to re-emphasize the importance of agriculture in
Malaysia’s economic development. This effort can be
seen in the Fig. 4, where agricultural land has started to
replace abandoned settlements. However these changes
are only possible on the Malay Reserves land, where
government policy allows developments that might be
of benefit to society. The customary lands remain
unattended. Furthermore, this section has investigated
the potential land capacity, through measuring the
green area (land that is not used or is covered by a
permanent building) by using the basic grid technique.
The same basic grid system was also applied to
measuring the potential land capacity of each sample
(at micro scale). For this analysis, the sample areas
were divided into 1 mx1m of grids in GIS to accurately
record land use such as activities and functions, fauna
and flora and other related information. Figure 5a, b
shows the percentage of green ratios and a ranking of
land availability in the each household dwelling.
Generally, the graph shows that each house in the
Kampong has a minimum of 30 msq of green area.
Both graphs indicate where the ratio of the green areas
in each households unit reached the minimum of 50 %
of the overall house compound, showing that each
house have green areas.
From the audit on land that has been done in
Kampong Gunong Pasir, in Negeri Sembilan, the
study revealed that there is a potential land capacity
2011  
Changes in landuse settlements in Kampong Gunong Pasir
2011  
Changes in agricultural land development in Kampong Gunong Pasir
a
b
Fig. 3 Chronology of
a Housing settlements in
1950, 1970 and 2011 and
b Agricultural Land use in
1950, 1970 and 2011 in Kg
Gunong Pasir—Malaysia.
Source Pilot Study based on
Population and Housing
Malaysia Census Report
2010
Fig. 4 Composite analysis of the landscape map for Kg
Gunong Pasir—Malaysia. Source Pilot Study based on Popu-
lation and Housing Malaysia Census Report 2010
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for future utilization. The results obtained from the
surveys identified the potential in the land capacity
which can be reutilized. About 50 % of the unattended
houses and land are available, due to rural–urban
migration associated with the legislation on land
ownership. This has created a significant potential for
the land to be available and accessible for the return
migrant, if de-urbanisation occurs.
It follows that when massive rural to urban
migration in Malaysia took place in 1970s, the rural
area was impacted heavily with about 50 % of its
population moving out and hollowing the land.
However the uniqueness of Malaysians’ laws and
land legislations that reserve the ‘Malay land owner-
ship’ protects the unattended land from being sold.
This abandoned land was said to not only remain
accessible for future but also still rich in ecological
functions and resources (Nor Atiah Ismail 2010). The
availability of these rural reserve land means that
going forward, rural capacity has the potential as one
of the ‘pull factor’ to influence reverse migration from
cities to rural. This situation could also become part of
future alternatives in dealing with de-urbanisation.
Conclusion: can devolution and rural capacity
trigger de-urbanisation?
The foregoing discussion has explored two factors;
one of governance (devolution) and the second of an
economic/social nature (land capacity) in Kenya and
Malaysia respectively and the potential to check and
balance rapid urbanisation.
It was also established that urbanisation is under-
pinned and sustained by the availability of energy
resources. In the face of peaking fossil fuels, prescrip-
tive rapid urbanisation especially in Africa will not be
sustainable in the long run.
Therefore, there is need to find alternative pro-
cesses of growth that do not necessarily depend on
fossil fuel energy resources to grow. This is where the
unique similarities and differences between Kenya
and Malaysia come into play. Kenya can look to, and
learn from Malaysia which is almost going full circle
in the process of industrialization, urbanisation, and
de-industrialization and hence de-urbanization.
Malaysia discovered oil and gas almost 50 years ago
at a time when the Kenyan Republic was being born. It
is safe to assume that Kenya’s recent discovery of oil
and gas will peak in 2064 (50 years from now).
Fifty years from now Kenya should see itself as
Malaysia today. It therefore does not necessarily need
to take a similar growth path like Malaysia towards
rapid industrialization especially in cities. Kenya can
skip some of the steps in this growth pattern, like rapid
urbanization and deindustrialization and begin to
manage sustainably and simultaneously both its
industrialization and de-urbanization process.
Rapid urbanization in Malaysia meant that the rural
areas were neglected. With depleting oil and gas, only
rural capacity protected by Malaysian customary law
will ensure that the return immigrants are able to settle
Fig. 5 a Graph showing the percentage of green ratio in kg. Gunong Pasir. b Graph showing the rank of land availability within
respondent houses
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in the country. In Kenya, the advent of devolution
should afford growth opportunities of underdevelop-
ment counties to relieve pressure on urban areas hence
triggering urban–rural immigration. This will be one
way to manage rapid urbanization. The ancestral land
factor will also play a major role.
In their preliminary assessment of devolution, 1 year
after its implementation, Ghai and Ghai (2014) in
reporting on the views of a panel discussion on
devolution organized by the Katiba Institute, stated that
all the panellists believed that there was a good chance
devolution will turn out to be a success with time.
They further state that overall the public perception
was satisfied with the county performance, health
services were improving and even people in the far off
County of Mandera who had hitherto felt alienated,
now felt a part of Kenya. Such positive perception may
in the long run be the initial triggers, attracting urban
residents to rural counties.
Additionally, it has been established that devolu-
tion contributes to the production of space and hence
right to the city through empowering citizens at local
level by charting their own agenda to participate and
appropriate resources for local development. This has
been reflected in the recent impeachment of the Embu
County governor over misappropriation of public
funds (Standard Media 04/09/14). This all goes to
show that citizens are pushing for more accountability
at county level as a result of livelier discussions and
political debates (Ghai and Ghai 2014).
Further as the process of urbanisation is under-
pinned by the availability of energy resources, it
follows that wherever these resources are found, (case
of Turkana) which is mostly in rural areas, devolution
has given power to the local residents to appropriate
them. Subsequently, these resources can be appropri-
ated to enhance rural capacity to support returning
urban migrants who have an attachment to their
ancestral land or who did not fare well in the city.
In the case of Malaysia, it has been illustrated that
depleting gas and oil reserves may trigger de-indus-
trialisation and hence de-urbanisation. In such a
scenario rural capacity in the form of fertile reserve
land is capable of supporting return immigrants.
This paper hypothesised that the devolution process
in Kenya may in time be a pull factor, triggering
urban–rural immigration. In the first place by provid-
ing access to more democratic space and decision
making at the grassroots level leading to creation of
locally based development agenda. Within this
agenda, citizens will be able to directly participate
and exercise their right to the city in producing the
spaces they want.
One year into it implementation, the initial feed-
back indicates that indeed this is happening with
people demanding more accountability, discussion of
policy issues at local level and engagement in lively
political debates albeit with continuing challenges and
threats to devolution (Ghai and Ghai 2014).
Unlike cities in the developed countries that have
experienced de-urbanisation but did not have the
potential of rural areas, people have had to re-adapt in
the cities to make a living. However, both Kenya and
Malaysia have a unique potential of the ancestral land,
customary and reserve land respectively that protects the
land ownership and remains accessible for future utili-
zation. It is arguable that the resilience of Kenyan and
Malaysian cities is intertwined with the urgent develop-
ment of its rural capacity.Devolution provides oneway to
enhance this relationship. It is possible that such a
relationship will redefine the current prescriptive urban-
ization model and hence trigger de-urbanization. Urban
policy makers need to recognize this unique relationship
and craft agenda that will enhance rather that supresss it.
Therefore it is essential for this study to enhance and
further this uniqueness towards future implementation in
order for the society to achieve resilience.
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